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DUE-ON-SALE CLAUSES AFTER PASSAGE OF
THE GARN ACT: MORE QUESTIONS
THAN ANSWERS?
On October 15, 1982, the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institu-
tions Act became law. This Comment surveys many unresolved
issues remaining after passage of the Act. It particularly focuses
upon the date the window period begins, the extent to which the
window is abrogated by exceptions provided in the Act, the sta-
tus of conversion loans, and the constitutionality of the retroac-
tive application of the Act.
INTRODUCTION
The law regarding due-on-sale clauses has undergone major
changes in the last decade, particularly in California. In 1978, the
California Supreme Court held in Wellenkamp v. Bank of
America' that the clauses were not enforceable in an outright
sale situation unless the lender's security was threatened. The
impact of this holding was significantly magnified by its retroac-
tive application,2 which was intended to shelter earlier purchasers
from enforcement of these clauses. This decision provided only a
short respite for consumers, because four years later two major
restrictions were placed on Wellenkemp and its progeny.
The two major restrictions were Fidelity Federal Savings and
Loan Association v. de la Cuesta3 and the Garn-St. Germain De-
pository Institutions Act of 1982 (Garn Act).4 In de la Cuesta, the
1. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
2. Two exceptions to a retroactive application of the decision were enunci-
ated by the court. See infra note 39.
3. 102 S. Ct. 3014 (1982).
4. Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 341, 96 Stat. 1489 (1982).
The Gan Act covers much more than due-on-sale clauses. Title I, part C, is
the focus of this Comment. The Act consists of eight titles:
1. Deposit Insurance Flexibility
2. Net Worth Certificates
3. Thrift Institutions Restructuring
4. Provisions Relating to National and Member Banks
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United States Supreme Court held that due-on-sale clauses are
enforceable when the mortgage is held by a federally-chartered
savings and loan association. This decision disrupted the home
loan industry, essentially placed all lenders at a disadvantage,
and eventually prompted federal legislation. Under de la Cuesta,
federally-chartered lenders could enforce due-on-sale clauses, and
consequently, update their mortgage portfolios; however, this was
an illusory advantage. Buyers subsequently preferred to deal
with lenders who could not enforce these clauses. Lenders not af-
fected by the de la Cuesta decision were also disadvantaged be-
cause they were in serious financial difficulties in the rising
interest-rate market and could not update their mortgage portfo-
lios. The Garn Act, signed into law October 15, 1932, was enacted
in response to the perceived disarray and inequities in the home
loan industry. With certain exceptions,5 the Act allows lenders to
enforce the due-on-sale clauses. The Act places lenders on a
more competitive footing, but it has also raised numerous ques-
tions. This Comment deals with unresolved issues concerning the
commencement of the window period,6 and closely examines the
constitutionality of the retroactive application of the Garn Act.
HISTORY OF DuE-oN-SALE CLAUSES
Some background information on due-on-sale clauses will be
helpful to an understanding of the recent changes in due-on-sale
law.7 Prior to 1930, provisions restricting the owner's ability to
transfer his interest in property without the lender's consent were
rarely inserted in mortgages or deeds of trust.8 Due-on-sale
5. Amendments to the Federal Credit Union Act
6. Property, Casualty, Life Insurance Activities of Bank Holding
Companies
7. Miscellaneous
8. Alternative Mortgage Transactions
5. See infra note 45 for a list of the transactions that do not trigger enforce-
ment of the clause.
6. The window period provision precludes enforcement of due-on-sale
clauses upon transfer during a specified time period. See infra note 52 for the text
of the window period provision.
7. The purpose of this section is to provide only the minimal background nec-
essary to an understanding of the Garn Act's impact. For a more comprehensive
analysis of early due-on-sale clause decisions, see Bonanno, Due on Sale and Pre-
payment Clauses in Real Estate Financing in California in Times of Fluctuating
Interest Rates--Legal Issues and Alternatives, 6 U.S.F.L. REv. 267 (1972) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Bonanno]. For an excellent article that emphasizes the more recent
Wellenkamp case and its impact, see Crane, Wellenkamp v. Bank of America: A
Victory for the Consumer? 31 HAsTGs L.J. 275 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Crane].
8. Goddard, Non-Assignment Provisions in Land Contracts, 31 MIcE. L. REv.
1, 7-8 (1932). At common law, such clauses were often seen in land sales contracts.
Bonanno, supra note 7, at 271.
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clauses were originally inserted in notes and security instruments
to provide "the lender ... a choice of borrowers to guard against
the moral risks, . . . usually waste or poor credit which increase
the likelihood of having to retake the property."9 Rarely were the
early due-on-sale clauses enforced.' 0
In the late 1960's, interest rates began to rise," resulting in the
extensive use of due-on-sale clauses.12 Savings and loan associa-
tions had made long-term, fixed-rate loans on real property at
older, lower interest rates and when interest rates rose they were
unable to update their long-term mortgage portfolios to higher,
short-term interest rates on deposits. Thus savings and loan as-
sociations were unable to keep their portfolios at current interest
rates, and they began losing money.13 Enforcement of the due-
on-sale clause became vital to the survival of savings and loan as-
sociations.14 The clause, which was originally intended to protect
the lender's security, is now used as a means of extracting higher
interest rates, large back-interest payments, and assumption fees
commonly known as "1points."'5
The Due-on Clause in California
Lenders knew that unrestricted enforcement of the due-on-sale
clause would bring a quick recovery to the ailing savings and loan
industry, especially in California where the average turnover of
9. Hetland, Real Property and Real Property Security: The Well-Being of the
Law, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 151, 170 (1965).
10. Even today, the clause generally is not enforced by requiring the borrower
to pay off the balance of the loan; rather, the party acquiring the property agrees
to pay a higher rate of interest in return for the bank's agreement not to accelerate
the loan. See Comment, Due-on-Sale Clauses in Deeds of Trust: State Regulation
or Preemption, 1979 ARiz. ST. L.J. 367, 368.
11. In April of 1967, the average residential mortgage yield was 6.29 percent In
February of 1970, the yield peaked at 9.29 percent and remained above 9 percent
until October 1970. Bonanno, supra note 7, at 268 n.4.
12. Id. at 271.
13. In the first six months of 1982, savings and loan associations lost a record
$3.3 billion. Overall losses for 1981 were $4.6 billion. In 1980, the savings and loan
associations showed a profit In the first half of 1982, 82 percent of federally-in-
sured savings and loan associations lost money. In the first half of 1981, 70 percent
lost money; in the last half of that year, 85 percent lost money. L.A. Times, Oct 12,
1982, pt IV, at 2, coL 1.
14. Enforcement of the clauses was also vital to the real estate industry, which
relies on the availability of credit to finance most transactions. Bonanno, supra
note 7, at 268-70.
15. See id. at 275.
homes occurs every seven years.16 As each home is sold, the loan
is "recaptured" and updated to higher interest rates. The case of
Coast Bank v. Minderhout,17 decided in 1964, was the first re-
ported California case of an attempt to enforce a "due-on" clause.
The borrowers had given no other security and agreed not to
transfer or encumber their property without the lender's consent
until they had repaid the money they owed the lender. The bor-
rowers sold the property without the lender's consent. The lender
chose to accelerate the debt and commenced a foreclosure action.
The California Supreme Court concluded that only unreasonable
restraints on alienation are forbidden by section 711 of the Cali-
fornia Civil Code. The Court further stated that "it was not un-
reasonable for [the lender] to condition its continued extension
of credit to [the borrowers] on their retaining their interest in the
property that stood as security for the debt."18 The due-on clause
in Coast Bank was upheld, but the court's ultimate justification
for the clause was not clear.' 9
The Coast Bank decision was followed by Cherry v. Home Sav-
ings and Loan Association,20 in which the plaintiff sellers and
buyers sought a declaratory judgment against the exercise of a
due-on-sale clause. The appellate court held that a lender may
enforce the provision to protect his security against risk of loss
and to take advantage of rising interest rates.2 1 After Cherry, the
law regarding due-on clauses began to change.
Three California Supreme Court cases decided in the 1970's
have established the body of law in California with respect to the
enforceability of due-on clauses. The first is La Sala v. American
Savings and Loan Association,22 a 1971 decision in which the
court began to limit the enforceability of due-on clauses. In 1963,
the La Salas borrowed $20,700 from American Savings and Loan
Association at six percent interest. They executed a note and a
trust deed with a due-on-encumbrance clause and certified in
writing that they would not give or execute any other lien or
charge on the property. In June of 1969, they borrowed $3800, exe-
cuting a note and second deed of trust as security for the loan. In
16. Crane, supra note 7, at 276.
17. 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964), overruled in part, Wel-
lenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
18. 61 Cal. 2d at 316-17, 392 P.2d at 268, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 508. Section 711 states
that "[c]onditions restraining alienation, when repugnant to the interest created,
are void." CAl. CrM. CODE § 711 (Deering 1982).
19. Bonanno, supra note 7, at 274.
20. 276 Cal. App. 2d 574,81 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1969), disapproved in Wellenkamp v.
Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
21. 276 Cal. App. 2d at 578-79, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
22. 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).
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July, American Savings and Loan Association notified the La
Salas of its right to accelerate, but offered to waive the right if the
La Salas would pay waiver fees of $150 and increase the rate of
interest on the first deed of trust from six to nine percent.2 3 The
court distinguished the due-on-sale clause from the due-on-en-
cumbrance clause, noting that a junior encumbrance does not ter-
minate a borrower's interest in the property, but a sale generally
does terminate that interest and might threaten the lender's se-
curity.24 Because the court believed that the due-on-encum-
brance clause involved less risk to the lender's security, the court
held that the due-on-encumbrance clause could be sustained only
by finding that enforcement was reasonably necessary to protect
the lender's security.25
In Tucker v. Lassen Savings and Loan Association,26 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court further limited the automatic enforcement
of due-on-sale clauses. The Court, however, left open the ques-
tion of whether due-on-sale clauses were enforceable in an out-
right sale (a sale in which title is transferred). The sale in Tucker
was accomplished through an installment land contract (a trans-
action which gives the purchaser immediate possession but re-
tains legal title in the seller as security until the purchase price is
paid). The main issue was whether enforcement of the due-on-
sale clause in this situation would be an unreasonable restraint
on alienation. The court considered the quantum of restraint on
alienation imposed by enforcement of the clause, as well as the
justification for it.27 The court concluded that the lender's desire
to increase its interest rate is not a sufficient justification for the
amount of restraint imposed by enforcement of the clause upon
the execution of an installment land contract.28
The third major California Supreme Court decision regarding
due-on clauses was the 1978 decision of Wellenkamp v. Bank of
23. Id. at 869-70, 489 P.2d at 1115-16, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 851-52.
24. Id. at 880, 489 P.2d at 1123, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
25. Id. at 883, 489 P.2d at 1126, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
26. 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974).
27. ' To the degree that enforcement of the [due-on] clause would result in an
increased quantum of actual restraint on alienation in the particular case, a
greater justification for such enforcement from the standpoint of the lender's legit-
imate interests will be required in order to warrant enforcement." Id. at 636, 526
P.2d at 1173, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
28. Id. at 639 n.10, 526 P.2d at 1175-76 n.10, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 639-40 n.10.
America.29 In 1975, Wellenkamp purchased a piece of real prop-
erty from the Mans, paying them the amount of their equity in
the property and agreeing to take the property subject to the bal-
ance of the existing loan with Bank of America. Bank of America
refused Wellenkamp's payments. The bank told her it intended to
accelerate unless she assumed the loan at an increased rate of in-
terest. Wellenkamp sought an injunction and a declaration that
the exercise of such a clause, without any showing that Bank of
America's security had been impaired as a result of the sale to
her, constituted an unreasonable restraint on alienation in viola-
tion of California law.30
The trial court granted a preliminary injunction to restrain the
foreclosure sale. The bank then demurred to Wellenkamp's com-
plaint on the ground that automatic enforcement of the due-on-
sale clause after a transfer of property in an outright sale is valid
under California law, so the facts stated were not sufficient to
constitute a cause of action for declaratory relief.31 The demurrer
was sustained without leave to amend. The court of appeal af-
firmed. Wellenkamp appealed and was granted a hearing before
the California Supreme Court. The key issue to be resolved was
whether enforcement of a due-on-sale clause contained in a deed
of trust securing real property constitutes an unreasonable re-
straint on alienation upon an outright sale of that property.32
The court, using the test announced in- Tucker, first considered
the quantum of restraint on alienation imposed by enforcement of
the clause in outright sale situations. Justice Manuel, writing for
the 6-1 majority, redefined "outright sale" to include any sale by
the borrower in which legal title is transferred.33 This was neces-
sary to avoid dicta in Tucker and La Sala which suggested that
restraint from an outright sale appeared to be de minimis. In
Tucker and La Sala, "outright sale" referred to transactions in
which the seller/trustor received full payment from the buyer (an
"all cash to seller" sale). Outright sales, as redefined, include
cases such as Wellenkamp's, known as "cash to loan" arrange-
ments. These arrangements are made where new financing is un-
available or economically infeasible. The buyer pays the seller
only the amount of the seller's equity, and assumes or takes "sub-
ject to" the existing deed of trust.3
The court said that in "cash to loan" and other situations, a re-
29. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
30. Id. at 946-47, 582 P.2d at 972, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
31. Id. at 947, 582 P.2d at 972, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
32. Id. at 946, 582 P.2d at 971-72, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 380-81.
33. Id. at 950, 582 P.2d at 974, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
34. Id. at 949-50, 582 P.2d at 974, 148 CaL Rptr. at 383.
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straint on alienation is possible if economic conditions are such
that new financing is either unavailable or economically infeasi-
ble, and the lender is unwilling to permit assumption of the ex-
isting loan.35 Even if the lender is willing to allow the buyer to
assume the loan at an increased rate, the court explained that an
inhibitory effect on transfer might still result because the buyer
might insist on a lower purchase price to compensate for in-
creased interest costs, and the seller might then refuse to sell.36
"In either event," the court said, "the result in terms of a restraint
on alienation is clear."3 7
According to the Tucker test, once a restraint on alienation is
found, the court must measure the justification. The Wellenkamp
court did not find significant justification in Bank of America's
contention that the lender's interest in maintaining its portfolio at
current interest rates justifies the restraint imposed by the exer-
cise of a due-on-sale clause upon transfer of title in an outright
sale. The due-on-sale clause was designed to protect against im-
pairment of the lender's security, not to protect lenders from
business risks of inflation and a competitive money market. The
court did not believe the property owner should bear the burden
of the lender's mistaken economic projections.38
The Wellenkamp court held that a due-on-sale clause in a prom-
issory note or deed of trust cannot be enforced when an outright
sale occurs unless the lender can demonstrate that enforcement
is reasonably necessary to protect against impairment of its se-
curity or the risk of default. This holding overruled Coast Bank to
the extent that opinion was inconsistent. Of particular impor-
tance, the court refused to limit its holding to a purely prospective
effect.39 The lenders' expectations of economic benefit from en-
forcement of these clauses was insufficient justification to over-
come the rule that a supreme court's decision overruling a former
35. Id. at 950, 582 P.2d at 974-75, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 383-84. But see Comment,
Due-on-Sale Clauses: The Economic and Legal Issues, 43 U. Prrr. L. REV. 441
(1982).
36. 21 Cal. 3d at 950-51, 582 P.2d at 975, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
37. Id. at 951, 582 P.2d at 975, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
38. Id. at 952-53, 582 P.2d at 976-77, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385-86.
39. The Wellenkamp holding applied retroactively before September 24, 1978,
the date of the decision, with two exceptions: 1. where the lender had enforced
the due-on-sale clause, resulting in sale by foreclosure or in discharge of the accel-
erated debt; 2. where the lender had waived enforcement of the clause in return
for an agreement that modified the existing financing. Id. at 953-54, 582 P.2d at 976-
77, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385-86.
decision is retrospective. Thus, after Wellenkamp, due-on-sale
clauses were of little effect in California.
de la Cuesta: The United States Supreme Court Speaks on Due-
on-Sale Clauses
Wellenkamp was not, however, the final word on due-on-sale
clauses. On June 28, 1982, the United States Supreme Court pub-
lished its decision in Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan Associa-
tion v. de la Cuesta.4 0 This decision states that federally-
chartered savings and loan associations are unaffected by the Wel-
lenkamp decision, thus upholding the enforceability of due-on-
sale clauses in instruments held by those institutions. 4 1 The de la
Cuesta decision gives federally-chartered savings and loan as-
sociations the boost their troubled industry needed, but at the ex-
pense of consumers who may now be forced to renegotiate their
loans and pay back-interest fees.
The Depository Institutions Act of 1982: Congress Speaks on Due-
on-Sale Clauses
After de la Cuesta, savings and loan associations were in a state
of disruption. Many state-chartered associations were converting
to federal charters in order to enforce due-on-sale clauses and to
take advantage of opportunities to acquire savings and loan as-
sociations in other states.42 It is still an open question, however,
whether due-on-sale clauses in loans made before the institution
converted to a federal charter will be enforceable under de la
Cuesta. The Court in de la Cuesta expressly declined to rule on
this issue.43
40. 102 S. Ct. 3014 (1982).
41. Certain exceptions are provided for in the Garn Act. See infra note 52.
42. Since 1980, 24 state-chartered savings and loan associations in California
have switched to federal charters. L.A. Times, Nov. 23, 1982, pt. IV, at 1, coL 4.
43. 102 S. Ct. at 3031 n.24. An Orange County Superior Court judge has tenta-
tively ruled that loans made by these institutions are assumable. In Bassett v. Fi-
delity Federal Savings and Loan Association, Judge Phillip A. Petty made a
preliminary ruling that Robert Bassett could assume a thirty-year, fixed-rate mort-
gage on commercial property be bought in 1981. Civ. No. 366395 (Super. Ct. Orange
County, Cal. Oct. 8, 1982). The loan Bassett assumed was made at 9.8 percent in
1977 (pre-Wellenkamp) by Mariners Savings and Loan Association, a state-
chartered association which converted to a federal charter one month after the
Wellenkamp decision, and was later purchased by Fidelity Federal Savings and
Loan Association. Bassett sued Fidelity Federal for wrongful foreclosure when it
tried to exercise the due-on-sale clause in his loan agreement to increase the in-
terest rate. The lender argued that its action was proper under federal law. The
decision, announced before passage of the Garn Act, was that Fidelity Federal
"will be subject to the rule in Wellenkamp" and therefore, mortgages made under
its state charter will be assumable. In another pre-Garn Act case, Bleeker Assoc.
v. Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 544 F. Supp. 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), the court held
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The beneficial effects of de la Cuesta on federal financial insti-
tutions were foreseeably limited. Consumers who became aware
of the significance of the de la Cuesta holding understandably
preferred to deal with state-chartered institutions for which due-
on-sale clauses were still unenforceable. The Gan Act was
passed to remedy the situation and "to place all lenders on a
more competitive footing"44 by making due-on-sale clauses en-
forceable, except in certain specified instances. 45
Subsections (b) and (c) of section 341 of the Garn Act are of
primary importance. Subsection 341(b) (1)46 essentially gives a
lender47 the right to enter into or enforce a due-on-sale clause.48
that the Federal Home Loan Bank Board regulation, passed in 1976, did not pur-
port to give federal associations the power to exercise due-on-sale clauses in loans
originated by non-federal associations, when the state law was contrary.
44. S. REP. No. 536, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3075.
45. Subsection 341(d) provides certain exceptions to the enforceability of the
due-on-sale clause:
1. the creation of a lien or other encumbrance subordinate to the
lender's security instrument which does not relate to a transfer of
rights of occupancy in the property;
2. the creation of a purchase money security interest for household
appliances;
3. a transfer by devise, descent, or operation of law on the death of a
joint tenant or tenant by the entirety;
4. the granting of a leasehold interest of three years or less not con-
taining an option to purchase;
5. a transfer to a relative resulting from the death of a borrower;
6. a transfer where the spouse or children of the borrower become an
owner of the property
7. a transfer resulting from a decree of a dissolution of marriage, le-
gal separation agreement, or from an incidental property settle-
ment agreement, by which the spouse of the borrower becomes an
owner of the property;
8. a transfer into an inter vivos trust in which the borrower is and re-
mains a beneficiary and which does not relate to a transfer of
rights of occupancy in the property; or
9. any other transfer or disposition described in regulations pre-
scribed by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.
Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 341(d), 96 Stat. 1506-07 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5402).
46. "Notwithstanding any provision of the constitution or laws (including judi-
cial decisions) of any State to the contrary, a lender may, subject to subsection
(c), enter into or enforce a contract containing a due-on-sale clause with respect to
a real property loan." Id. § 341(b) (1), 96 Stat. at 1505 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 5402).
47. Subsection 341(a) (2) defines a lender as "a person or government agency
making a real property loan or any assignee or transferee, in whole or in part, of
such a person or agency." Id. § 341(a) (2), 96 Stat. at 1505 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1701j-3).
48. Subsection 341(a) (1) defines a due-on-sale clause as "a contract provision
which authorizes a lender, at its option, to declare due and payable sums secured
Subsection 341(b)(2)49 states that exercise of the due-on-sale
clause is governed by the terms of the loan contract. The last
part, subsection (b) (3) of section 341,50 encourages lenders to per-
mit assumptions of real property loans at the existing rate or at a
blended rate; that is, a rate between the contract and market
rates.5 1
The Garn Act successfully addressed the issue of disparity
among lenders. Additionally, the Act dealt with the problem of
loans in those states that had previously declared due-on-sale
clauses unenforceable. By creating a grace period on enforceabil-
ity to accommodate those states, the Act creates a myriad of is-
sues concerning entitlement to this "window."
THE THREE-YEAR WINDOW
For states that have restricted the enforcement of due-on-sale
clauses, subsection (c) of section 34152 provides a three-year
by the lender's security instrument if all or any part of the property, or an interest
therein, securing the real property loan is sold or transferred without the lender's
prior written consent." Id. § 341(a) (1), 96 Stat. at 1505 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1701j-3).
49. Subsection 341(b) (2) reads:
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), the exercise by the
lender of its option pursuant to such a clause shall be exclusively gov-
erned by the terms of the loan contract, and all rights and remedies of the
lender and the borrower shall be fixed and governed by the contract.
Id. § 341(b) (2), 96 Stat. at 1505 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5402).
50. Subsection 341(b) (3) reads:
In the exercise of its option under a due-on-sale clause, a lender is en-
couraged to permit an assumption of a real property loan at the existing
contract rate or at a rate which is at or below the average between the
contract and market rates, and nothing in this section shall be interpreted
to prohibit any such assumption.
Id. § 341(b) (3), 96 Stat. at 1505 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5402).
51. The Gan Act does not make it clear what the word "encourages" requires
of lenders. The Senate Report uses the phrase "strongly urges" rather than "en-
courages." S. REP. No. 536, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3075.
52. Subsection 341(c) (1) reads:
In the case of a contract involving a real property loan which was made
or assumed, including a transfer of the liened property subject to the real
property loan, during the period beginning on the date a State adopted a
constitutional provision or statute prohibiting the exercise of due-on-sale
clauses, or the date on which the highest court of such State has rendered
a decision (or if the highest court has not so decided, the date on which
the next highest appellate court has rendered a decision resulting in a
final judgment if such decision applies State-wide) prohibiting such exer-
cise, and ending on the date of enactment of this section, the provisions of
subsection (b) shall apply only in the case of a transfer which occurs on
or after the expiration of 3 years after the date of enactment of this Act,
except that-
(A) a State, by a State law enacted by the State legislature prior to
the close of such 3-year period, with respect to real property loans
originated in the State by lenders other than national banks, Federal
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"window" during which certain due-on-sale clauses are not en-
forceable. The window applies to almost all lenders and individu-
als, except for federal savings and loan associations and federal
savings banks.53 It began with the date of enactment of the Garn
Act, October 15, 1982, and it ends three years later, October 15,
1985.54 After the window closes, specified due-on-sale clauses will
be enforceable unless, during the three-year period, restrictions
are imposed by: 1. a state legislature, with respect to real prop-
erty loans originated by non-federal lenders; 2. the Comptroller of
Currency, with respect to real property loans originated by na-
tional banks; or 3. the National Credit Union Administration
Board with respect to real property loans originated by federal
credit unions. 55
Loans originated or assumed during the time the state prohib-
ited the exercise of the due-on clause are entitled to the three-
year window. The Gan Act is ambiguous in its statement of
when this "state prohibition period" begins. In California, the
state prohibition period has at least four potential points of com-
mencement. It could begin in 1971, with the La Sala decision, in
1974 with the Tucker decision, or in 1978 with the Wellenkamp de-
cision because the due-on clause in each case was held unen-
forceable.5 6 The fourth potential beginning is the date of any
state constitutional provision or statute that prohibits exercise of
the clause. Thus, for California, the period could possibly have
started as early as 1872, when section 711 of the California Civil
Code first invalidated restraints on alienation. The following dia-
gram clarifies the possible time sequences: 57
savings and loan associations, Federal savings banks, and Federal
credit unions, may otherwise regulate such contracts, in which case
subsection (b) shall apply only if such State law so provides; and
(B) the Comptroller of the Currency with respect to real property
loans originated by national banks or the National Credit Union Ad-
ministration Board with respect to real property loans originated by
Federal credit unions may, by regulation prescribed prior to the close
of such period, otherwise regulate such contracts, in which case sub-
section (b) shall apply only if such regulation so provides.
Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 341(c) (1), 96 Stat. 1505-06 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5402).
53. 'This subsection does not apply to a loan which was originated by a Fed-
eral savings and loan association or Federal savings bank." Id. § 341(c) (2) (C), 96
Stat. at 1506 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5402).




57. In Dawn Inv. Co., Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 30 Cal. 3d 695, 639
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Potential beginning points of state prohibition
The general consensus seems to be that Wellenkamp marks the
beginning of the window period in California. The Federal Home
Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) has been placed in charge of inter-
preting the Gan Act, and one of its top legal advisors believes
that in California the window begins with the August 25, 1978 Wel-
lenkamp decision.58 Thomas Vartanian, general counsel of the
FHLBB, said that when the rules regarding the Gan Act are pub-
lished, no changes from the FHLBB's initial reading given to the
Act are likely59 1978 will probably be the operative date. Also,
the legislative history indicates that the Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs believes 1978 is the date on which the
highest court in California placed a restriction on the enforce-
ment of due-on-sale clauses.60 Finally, the United States Su-
preme Court indicated in a footnote to de la Cuesta, that
Wellenkamp was the first California decision limiting a lender's
right to accelerate a loan in outright transfers where the security
was unimpaired. 6
1
The date when the state prohibition' period begins is crucial to
consumers. If the 1978 Wellenkamp decision marks the beginning
of the state prohibition period, then a due-on-sale clause in a con-
tract made or assumed between 1978 and 1982 is enforceable only
P.2d 974, 180 Cal. Rptr. 332 (1982) the court extended the Wellenkamp holding to
noninstitutional lenders and to commercial property, so that 1982 could mark the
beginning of the state prohibition period for private lenders.
58. L.A. Times, Dec. 2, 1982, pt. IV, at 1, coL 4.
59. Id.
60. S. REP. No. 536, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 n.3 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3076.
61. The Court further stated:
The California Supreme Court's prior cases, which forbade the auto-
matic enforcement of due-on-sale provisions when the borrower further
encumbered the property securing the loan [citing La Sala ] and when the
borrower entered into an installment land contract covering all or part of
the security property [citing Tucker], permitted the unrestricted exercise
of due-on-sale clauses in cases of outright transfers of the security.
102 S. Ct. at 3031 n.24.
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in the case of a transfer occurring on or after three years from the
enactment of the legislation, which would be 1985. If, however, La
Sala is the first decision prohibiting enforcement, then the state
prohibition period starts in 1971 and homebuyers who made or as-
sumed real property loans from 1971 through 1977 would also re-
ceive the three-year window period. If the courts choose 1978 as
the beginning of state prohibition against the clause, the issue of
whether the clause may be retroactively enforced becomes vital
to consumers who purchased real property in 1977 with a due-on-
sale clause in the deed of trust.62
Homeowners who purchased before the state prohibition period
began are not the only persons concerned about receiving the
benefit of the three-year window. Consumers whose loans were
made during the state prohibition period by a state-chartered in-
stitution that later switched to a federal charter are also con-
cerned that if de la Cuesta applies to them, they will not receive
the three-year window. The Garn Act contains broad preemption
language and could be viewed as supporting the ability of a feder-
ally-chartered savings and loan association to enforce a due-on-
sale clause in a loan originated by non-federal lenders. 63 The
Senate Report, however, takes a different view: "The identity of
the lender at the time the loan was originated determines
whether or not a loan is subject to window period restrictions.
For example, a loan originated by a state-chartered savings and
loan association which subsequently converted to a federally
chartered thrift institution will be subject to state due-on-sale re-
strictions for three years, unless state action provides other treat-
ment for such loans." 4 With passage of the Garn Act, many
state-chartered savings and loan associations no longer find it
62. A collateral problem of the Garn Act should also be noted. Subsection
(c) (2) (B) states: "A lender may not exercise its option pursuant to a due-on-sale
clause in the case of a transfer of a real property loan which is subject to this sub-
section where a transfer occurred prior to the date of enactment of this Act." Pub.
L. No. 97-320, § 341(c) (2) (B), 96 Stat. 1506 (1982) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5402)
(emphasis added). Subsection (a) (3) defines the term "real property loan" as "a
loan, mortgage, advance, or credit sale secured by a lien on real property ......
Id. § 341(a) (3), 96 Stat. 1505 (1982) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3). Thus,
subsection (c) (2) (B) is ambiguous, but will probably be interpreted to mean the
transfer of a piece of real property subject to a loan, not the loan itself.
63. Smuckler and Burke, Enforcement of Due on Sale Clauses After the Garn-
St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982: Selected Unresolved Problems
(Nov. 29, 1982) (on fie with author).
64. S. REP. No. 536, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & An. NEWS 3054, 3078 (emphasis added).
necessary to switch to federal charters; in fact, some are even
switching back.65
Another group of individuals whose loans were made during
the state prohibition period may nevertheless find their due-on-
sale clauses to be enforceable during the window period. Private
individuals who made loans during the state prohibition period
may also be able to enforce due-on-sale clauses because the Garn
Act grants lenders the power to enforce a due-on-sale clause
when a buyer fails to meet customary credit standards.66 The
customary credit standards clause is a "sleeper" because, while it
is not yet frequently enforced, it will probably be the subject of
future intense litigation.
The importance of this clause is best explained by a hypotheti-
cal example. Assume that in 1979 A wishes to sell his home to B.
At the time of the sale, A still owes money to a state-chartered
savings and loan association on a promissory note secured by a
first deed of trust. B agrees: to give A some cash as a down pay-
ment, to take subject to the existing first deed of trust, and to give
A a promissory note secured by a second deed of trust. The sec-
ond deed of trust and note contain a due-on-sale clause. In 1983,
B has an opportunity to sell the house to C. Without telling A, B
receives some cash from C, who takes subject to both the original
first trust deed and A's second trust deed, and C gives B a prom-
issory note secured by a third trust deed.
One month later, A learns of B's sale to C. A would like to have
B pay off his note to A; the sleeper clause may make that possi-
ble. It states that "for any clause to which subsection (b) does
not apply pursuant to this section, a lender [A, in this example]
may declare a loan due and payable pursuant to the terms of the
contract upon transfer to any successor or transferee [C, in this
example] of the borrower [B, in this example] who fails to meet
... customary credit standards."67 The term "customary credit
standards" is not defined in the Garn Act. Savings and loan as-
65. Additionally, California savings and loan associations will have expanded
investment powers in 1983. As a result, one California institution, Central Federal
Savings and Loan Association, has applied to switch from a federal charter to a
state charter. LA Times, Nov. 23, 1982, pt. IV at 1, col 4.
66. Under section 341(c) (2) (A) of the Garn Act-
For any contract to which subsection (b) does not apply pursuant to this
subsection, a lender may require any successor or transferee of the bor-
rower to meet customary credit standards applied to loans secured by
similar property, and the lender may declare the loan due and payable
pursuant to the terms of the contract upon transfer to any successor or
transferee of the borrower who fails to meet such customary credit
standards.
Pub. L. No. 97-320 § 341(c) (2) (A), 96 Stat. 1506 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5402).
67. Id.
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sociations generally have customary credit standards they apply
to borrowers, but there are no standards for private individuals.
Where, in addition to taking over a mortgage secured by a first
trust deed, the buyer (C) takes over an additional obligation se-
cured by a second trust deed and also gives a third trust deed, B
may be able to assert very high credit standards for C. Thus, A
can assert either. 1. C did not meet his standards and therefore
the due-on-sale clause is enforceable; or 2. A did not have a
chance to check C's credit and therefore the clause is enforceable.
In failing to prescribe the meaning of "customary credit stan-
dards," the Garn Act creates an opportunity for state prohibition
period lenders to enforce due-on-sale clauses during the window
period.
RETROACTIVITY
The due-on-sale dilemma involves two conflicting, retroactive
laws. One is the Wellenkamp decision, and the other is the Garn
Act. The California Supreme Court specifically stated in Wel-
lenkamp that its decision was retroactive, despite pleas from
lenders that the decision be given a purely prospective effect.
68 It
further stated that as a general rule, "a decision of a court of
supreme jurisdiction overruling a former decision is retrospective
in its operation ... .,69 In all likelihood, the Garn Act was also
intended to be retroactive because, when a transaction occurs, it
affects preexisting loans. The retroactivity and constitutionality
aspects of the Garn Act are important to consumers in determin-
ing their rights.
Is the Garn Act a Retrospective Law?70
A retrospective law is defined as one that "affects the rights, ob-
ligations, acts, transactions and conditions which are performed
or exist prior to the adoption of the statute."7 ' Legislative intent
68. 21 Cal. 3d at 953, 582 P.2d at 977, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 386. Two exceptions to the
retroactive effect, necessary to maintaining stability of real estate titles and inter-
est, were noted earlier in the text. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
69. 21 Cal. 3d at 954, 582 P.2d at 977, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 386 (quoting County of
Los Angeles v. Faus, 48 Cal. 2d 672, 680-81, 312 P.2d 680, 685 (1957)).
70. The terms retroactive and retrospective, as applied to laws, have been held
to be synonymous. American States Water Serv. Co. of Cal. v. Johnson, 31 Cal.
App. 2d 606, 88 P.2d 770 (1939). Thus, the terms are used interchangeably in this
Comment.
71. Id. at 613, 88 P.2d at 774.
is the key factor in deciding whether a law meets this definition.7 2
The intent is strictly construed in favor of prospectivity, such that
the legislation "shall not be given retroactive effect unless such
construction is required by explicit language or by necessary
implication."73
An examination of the Garn Act and its legislative history indi-
cate that the Act was probably intended to be retrospective. Sec-
tion 341(b)(1) of the Garn Act reads: "[n]otwithstanding any
provision of the constitution or laws (including the judicial deci-
sions) of any State to the contrary, a lender may ... enter into or
enforce a contract containing a such clause with respect to a real
property loan."74 Subsection (c) (1) abrogates the effect of sub-
section (b) (1) by carving out the state prohibition period excep-
tion. The Act does not, however, explicitly state that due-on-sale
clauses in loans taken "subject to" before the commencement of
the state prohibition period are enforceable. Had the Garn Act
not carved out a state prohibition period exception which pre-
dates the legislation, and makes the legislation impliedly retro-
active, a retroactive intent would not have been so easily
discernible.
The legislation does, however, provide the state prohibition pe-
riod, and is therefore impliedly retroactive. It would be illogical to
carve out a state prohibition period for due-on-sale claues in loans
made after commencement of the state prohibition period and
give them only a three-year window, when such clauses in loans
made prior to that time are not enforceable. Theoretically, lend-
ers who purchased after the state prohibition period should be
entitled to more protection than those who purchased before it
because the later purchasers had more reason to rely on the
unenforceability of the clause. If any doubt remains concerning
the legislature's intent, the Senate Report eliminates it: "[a]
lender's right to enforce a due-on-sale clause, in any loan not sub-
ject to the window period restrictions, would be governed by the
terms of the loan contract."75
Is Retroactive Application of the Garn Act Constitutional?
Two provisions of the United States Constitution allow condem-
72. See Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303 (1938).
73. United States v. St. Louis, San Francisco and Texas Ry. Co., 270 U.S. 1, 3(1926).
74. Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 341(b) (1), 96 Stat. 1469, 1505 (1982) (to be codified at 42
U.S.C. § 5402).
75. S. REP. No. 536, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3054, 3075 (emphasis added).
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nation of retrospective civil statutes.76 The first is article I, sec-
tion 10, which provides that states cannot pass laws which impair
the obligation of contracts. The second is the fifth amendment,
which provides that the federal government shall not deprive a
person of property without due process of law. The application of
these two provisions hinges on whether the legislation meets a
standard of reasonableness and, ultimately, they become en-
twined. However, the main concern is whether an unreasonable
deprivation of property has occurred. The interaction between
the contract clause and the due process clause has been de-
scribed as follows:
Although there is no clause expressly forbidding the federal government
to pass laws impairing the obligation of contracts, any federal law impair-
ing them in a manner which the Supreme Court deemed unreasonable
would doubtless be held to be a deprivation of property without due pro-
cess .... [T~he results might be the same if the contract clause were
dropped out of the Constitution, and the challenged statutes all judged as
reasonable or unreasonable deprivations of property.77
The main concern is the reasonableness of the law, rather than
whether it results in a deprivation of property without due pro-
cess or the impairment of a contract. An argument that contract
rights are impaired under the Garn Act would be tenuous be-
cause the legislation actually enforces, rather than impairs, the
literal terms of the contract. Because the argument that the Gain
Act results in an unreasonable deprivation of property without
due process seems to be a stronger argument, it will be covered
more thoroughly in this Comment.
Assuming the Garn Act was intended to be retroactive and that
Wellenkamp marks the commencement of the state prohibition
period, pre-Wellenkamp and post-Wellenkamp purchasers may
argue they are being unreasonably deprived of their property.
The Garn Act, they might say, results in a "taking" of their prop-
erty because a new purchaser can no longer take subject to the
existing loan balance, so their property is worth less than it was
before the enactment of the Gain Act.78 Additionally, some
76. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Leg-
islation, 73 HARv. L. REV. 692, 694 (1960).
77. Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause: MI, 57 HARv. L. REV.
852, 890-91 (1944) (emphasis added).
78. An argument frequently made by pre-Wellenkamp purchasers is the retro-
active holding in Wellenkamp interpreting section 711 gave them a "vested right."
Even assuming this is true, there is no set formula for determining exactly what a
vested right is and, once it vests, when that right can be taken away. See Smith,
Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 5 TEx. I REV. 231 (1927).
homeowners face foreclosure because they cannot afford higher
monthly mortgage and back-interest payments. Although post-
Wellenkamp purchasers are provided a three-year grace period in
which they can obtain new financing or sell their homes, their
property has also been devalued. This, they may urge, is unrea-
sonable because, at the time they entered into their contracts, the
highest court in California had declared, the clauses
unenforceable.
Will Retroactive Application of the Garn Act Result in an
Unreasonable Deprivation of Property Without Due
Process?
These consumer arguments must be viewed in relation to the
factors used in determining whether a retroactive law contra-
venes the due process clause. Two key factors are: 1. the nature
and strength of the public interest served by the statute; and
2. the extent to which the statute modifies or abrogates the as-
serted preenactment right.79 These factors will be analyzed to de-
termine whether the Garn Act causes an unreasonable
deprivation of property without due process.
Nature and Strength of the Public Interest
The public is obviously interested in keeping the savings and
loan industry in business, which is what the Garn Act was
designed to do. Retroactive state legislation was used during the
Great Depression to help financial institutions80 and mortgagors81
survive. The Garn Act however, reaches beyond the bounds of
necessity. A purely prospective application of the Act would al-
low the savings and loan associations to recover as new loans are
made.
Prospective application of the Act would yield a more equitable
result, because consumers who purchased from 1982 forward
would be on notice of the enforceabilty of due-on clauses. Lend-
ers would eventually recover with a prospective application of the
Act. A retrospective application however, carries the potential of
irreparable harm to homeowners, particularly in foreclosure
situations.
79. Hochman, supra note 76, at 697. A third factor the author discusses is the
nature of the right which the retroactive statute alters. This factor is not ad-
dressed in this Comment. See id. at 717-26.
80. Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. and Loan Ass'n of Newark, 310 U.S. 32 (1940).
81. Home Bldg. and Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
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Extent of Change in Preenactment Right
If retroactive, the Garn Act will have a significant impact on
rights previously acquired by the citizens of California. Consum-
ers who purchased between 1971 and the 1978 Wellenkamp deci-
sion could sense a trend toward the nonenforceability of the
clauses, in light of the La Sala and Tucker decisions. The retro-
active holding of Wellenkamp, making the clauses unenforceable
in California, confirmed the trend. Consumers who purchased in
the period between the decision of Wellenkamp and enactment of
the the Garn Act entered into contracts with a reasonable expec-
tation that the due-on-sale clause could only be enforced when a
threat to the lender's collateral was present. Enforcement of
these clauses upon a transfer of the property would reinstate the
result Wellenkamp sought to avoid: it would force purchasers to
bear the burden of the lender's mistaken economic projections.
The pre-enactment right against enforcement of due-on-sale
clauses is not merely modified or abrogated by the Garn Act; it is
completely destroyed. Complete destruction of the right is a sig-
nificant factor because "the closer a retroactive statute comes to
extinguishing the subincidents of that right, the less likely is the
Court to sustain the application of the statute."82 Another consid-
eration, according to W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 3 should be
"whether the person asserting [the] right would have entered
into the original transaction had he been able to foresee the sub-
sequent legislation." Consumers might have purchased their
homes even if they could have foreseen the legislation, but they
probably would have sought a lower purchase price from the
seller.
CONCLUSION
Economic conditions necessitated the passage of the Garn Act84
to assist the failing savings and loan industry. The constitutional-
ity of a retrospective application of the Garn Act is still open to
question. Unless interest rates decline significantly, savings and
loan associations will continue to enforce the clauses to improve
their economic condition. The courts must weigh the policy fac-
tors to determine whether retroactive application of the Act is an
82. Hochman, supra note 76, at 714.
83. 295 U.S. 56 (1935).
84. Hochman, supra note 76, at 715.
unreasonable deprivation of property without due process of law.
The legislature assisted the savings and loan institutions in pass-
ing the Garn Act. The courts must now provide some assistance
to the consumer. A prospective application of the act would not
force the consumer to bear the burden of the lender's mistaken
economic projections, and it would be more equitable to
consumers.
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